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Abstract 
This paper presents novel results, generated from a new simulation model of a contemporary financial market, that cast serious doubt on the previously 
widely accepted view of the relative performance of various well-known public-domain automated-trading algorithms. Put simply, we show here that if you 
use a more realistic market simulator, then trading algorithms previously thought to be the best-performing are shown to be not as good as people think 
they are, and some algorithms previously thought to be poor performers can be seen to do surprisingly well. Automated trading is now entirely commonplace 
in most of the world's major financial markets: adaptive algorithmic trading systems operate largely autonomously, interacting with other traders (either 
other automated systems, or humans) via an electronic exchange platform. Various public-domain trading algorithms have been proposed over the past 25 
years in a kind of arms-race, where each new trading algorithm was compared to the previous best, thereby establishing a "pecking order", i.e. a partially-
ordered dominance hierarchy from best to worst of the various trading algorithms. Many of these algorithms were developed, tested, and evaluated using 
simple minimal simulations of financial markets that only very weakly approximated the fact that real markets involve many different trading systems 
operating asynchronously and in parallel. In this paper we use BSE, a long-established public-domain market simulator, to run a set of experiments generating 
benchmark results from several well-known trading algorithms. BSE incorporates a very simple time-sliced approach to simulating parallelism, which has 
obvious known weaknesses. We then alter and extend BSE to make it threaded, so that different trader algorithms operate asynchronously and in parallel: 
we call this simulator Threaded-BSE (TBSE). We then re-run the trader experiments on TBSE and compare the TBSE results to our earlier benchmark results 
from BSE. Our comparison shows that the dominance hierarchy in our more realistic experiments is different from the one given by the original simple 
simulator. We conclude that simulated parallelism matters a lot, and that earlier results from simple simulations comparing different trader algorithms are 
no longer to be entirely trusted.  
Keywords: Financial Markets; Market Simulators; Simulation Methods; Trading Agents; Experimental Economics.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper presents new evidence that key results previously 
published in the literature on automated trading systems may be 
artefacts of the simplistic modelling and simulation methods used 
to generate them. In particular, we have taken a long-established 
public-domain simulator of a contemporary electronic financial 
market, called BSE, and used it to generate a set of benchmark 
results from four very widely-used public-domain automated-
trading algorithms, known as ZIC, ZIP, GDX, and AA (we explain 
these in more detail, later). These initial BSE benchmark results 
confirm the previously-published dominance-hierarchy, or 
"pecking order", where AA beats GDX, GDX beats ZIP, and ZIP beats 
ZIC, which we write in abbreviated form as AA>GDX>ZIP>ZIC. The 
BSE simulator is deliberately simple in its modelling of time, and 
uses only a single thread, a single computer process, which it 
divides among the various simulated automated traders in such a 
way that the response-time, the time for an automated trader to 
compute an answer, is not simulated and hence very complicated 
trading systems that would take a lot of "thinking time" to compute 
a response to some change in the market are treated as if they take 
exactly the same time as the very fastest of trading algorithms. This 
is clearly unrealistic, yet BSE's approach to simulating time is not 
uncommon.  
We then constructed a modified version of the BSE simulator, 
which is threaded, i.e. uses multiple concurrently running 
computer processes ("threads") to model the parallel and 
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asynchronous nature of real financial markets, where multiple 
traders operate independently, in parallel and asynchronously: we 
call this simulator Threaded-BSE (TBSE). We then re-run our 
experiments on TBSE and find, as we show here for the first time, 
that the dominance hierarchy in TBSE is very different from that 
found in BSE: from our current results it seems that when operating 
in parallel the dominance hierarchy is instead ZIP>AA>ZIC>GDX. 
This is a novel result and is the key contribution of this paper. That 
is, we demonstrate here that previous use of simplistic simulation 
methodologies has produced sets of results which, although widely 
cited, can now no longer be trusted.  
Section 2 of this paper gives a summary of the background to 
this work, and is taken largely verbatim from a position paper 
published by one of us at EMSS2019 (Cliff, 2019): our new results 
presented here can be read as an empirical illustration of the 
arguments made in that EMSS2019 paper. Section 3 gives more 
details of our methods; Section 4 shows key results; and Section 5 
offers a discussion of the results, and of possible avenues of further 
work. TBSE is fully documented in (Rollins, 2020), including details 
of the TBSE source-code repository on GitHub. 
2. Background 
2.1. Traders, Markets, and Experimental Economics 
The 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Vernon 
Smith, in recognition of Smith’s work in establishing and thereafter 
growing the field of Experimental Economics (abbreviated 
hereafter to “EE”). Smith showed that the microeconomic behavior 
of human traders interacting within the rules of some specified 
market, known technically as an auction mechanism, could be 
studied empirically, under controlled and repeatable laboratory 
conditions, rather than in the noisy messy confusing circumstances 
of real-world markets. The minimal laboratory studies could act as 
useful proxies for studying real-world markets of any type, but one 
particular auction mechanism has received the majority of 
attention: the Continuous Double Auction (CDA), in which any 
buyer can announce a bid-price at any time and any seller can 
announce an offer-price at any time, and in which at any time any 
trader in the market can accept an offer or bid from a counterparty, 
and thereby engage in a transaction. The CDA is the basis of major 
financial markets worldwide, and tens of trillions of dollars flow 
through CDA markets every year.  
Each trader in one of Smith's experimental CDA markets would 
be assigned a private valuation, a secret limit price: for a buyer this 
was the price above which he or she should not pay when 
purchasing an item; for a seller this was the price below which he 
or she should not sell an item. These limit-price assignments model 
the client orders executed by sales traders in real financial markets; 
we’ll refer to them just as assignments in the rest of this paper. 
Traders in EE experiments from Smith's onwards are often 
motivated by payment of some form of real-world reward that is 
proportional to the amount of "profit" that they accrue from their 
transactions: the profit is the absolute value of the difference 
between the limit price specified when a unit is assigned to a 
trader, and the actual transaction price for that unit.  
The limit prices in the assignments defined the market's supply 
and demand schedules, which are commonly illustrated in 
economics texts as supply and demand curves on a 2D graph with 
quantity on the horizontal axis and price on the vertical axis: where 
the two curves intersect is the market's theoretical competitive 
equilibrium point: indicating the equilibrium price (denoted here by 
P0). A fundamental observation from microeconomics (the study of 
markets and prices) is that competition among buyers pushes 
prices up, and competition among sellers pushers prices down, and 
these two opposing influences on prices balance out at the 
competitive equilibrium point; a market in which transaction prices 
rapidly and stably settles to the P0 value is often viewed by 
economists as efficient (for a specific definition of efficiency) 
whereas a market in which transactions consistently occur at off-
equilibrium prices is usually thought of as inefficient: for instance, 
if transaction prices are consistently above P0 then it's likely that 
buyers are being ripped off. By varying the prices in the traders' 
assignments in Smith's experiments, the nature of the market's 
supply and demand curves could be altered, and the effects of 
those variations on the speed and stability of the market's 
convergence toward an equilibrium point could be measured.  
Smith’s initial set of experiments were run in the late 1950’s, 
and were described in his first paper on EE, published in the 
prestigious Journal of Political Economy (JPE) in 1962. The 
experiment methods laid out in that 1962 paper would 
subsequently come to dominate the methodology of researchers 
working to build adaptive autonomous automated trading agents 
by combining tools and techniques from Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
and Machine Learning (ML). This strand of AI/ML research 
converged toward a common aim: specifying an artificial agent, an 
autonomous adaptive trading strategy, that could automatically 
tune its behavior to different market environments, and that could 
reliably beat all other known automated trading strategies, thereby 
taking the crown of being the current best trading strategy known 
in the public domain, i.e., the “dominant strategy”. Over the past 
20 years the dominant strategy crown has passed from one 
algorithm to another and until very recently Vytelingum’s (2006, 
2008) "AA" strategy, was widely believed to be the dominant 
strategy, but recent results using contemporary large-scale 
computational simulation techniques indicate that it does not 
always perform so well as was previously believed, as discussed in 
the next section: Section 2.2 briefly reviews key publications 
leading to the development of AA, and the recent research that 
called its dominance into question.  
2.2. A Brief History of Trading Agents 
If our story starts with Smith’s 1962 JPE paper, then the next 
major step came 30 years later, with a surprising result published 
in the JPE by Gode & Sunder (1993): this popularized a minimally 
simple automated trading algorithm now commonly referred to as 
ZIC. A few years later two closely related research papers were 
published independently and at roughly the same time, each 
written without knowledge of the other: the first was a Hewlett-
Packard Labs technical report by Cliff (1997) describing the 
adaptive AI/ML trading-agent strategy known as the ZIP algorithm; 
the second summarized the PhD thesis work of Gjerstad, in a paper 
co-authored with his PhD advisor (Gjerstad & Dickhaut 1998), 
describing an adaptive trading algorithm now widely known simply 
as GD. After graduating his PhD, Gjerstad worked at IBM’s TJ 
Watson Labs where he helped set up an EE laboratory that his IBM 
colleagues used in a study that generated world-wide media 
coverage when its results were published by Das et al. at the 
prestigious International Joint Conference on AI (IJCAI) in 2001. This 
paper presented results from studies exploring the behavior of 
human traders interacting with GD and ZIP robot traders, and 
demonstrated that both GD and ZIP reliably outperformed human 
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traders. A follow-on 2001 paper by Tesauro & Das (two co-authors 
of the IBM IJCAI paper) described a more extensively Modified GD 
(MGD) strategy, and later Tesauro & Bredin (2002) described the 
GD eXtended (GDX) strategy. Both MGD and GDX were each 
claimed to be the strongest-known public-domain trading 
strategies at the times of their publication.  
Subsequently, Vytelingum’s 2006 thesis introduced the 
Adaptive Aggressive (AA) strategy which, in a major journal paper 
(Vytelingum et al., 2008), and in later conference papers (De Luca 
& Cliff 2012a, 2012b), was shown to be dominant over ZIP, GDX, 
and human traders. Thus far then, ZIP had been beaten by GDX, 
and AA had beaten GDX, and hence AA held the title. In shorthand, 
we had AA>GDX>ZIP.  
In all of the studies discussed thus far, typically two or three 
different types of trading algorithm would be compared against 
each other on the basis of how much profit (or surplus, to use the 
economists' technical term) they extract from the market, so 
Algorithm A was said to dominate or outperform or beat or be 
stronger than Algorithm B if, over some number of market sessions, 
traders running A made more money than traders running B. 
Methods of comparison varied.  Sometimes a particular market set-
up (i.e., a specific number of sellers, number of buyers, and their 
associated limit-price assignments specifying the market's supply 
and demand schedules) would be homogeneously populated with 
traders of type A, and then the same market would be re-run with 
all traders instead being type B, and an A/B comparison of 
profitability in the absence of any other trading algorithms could 
then be made. In other comparisons, for a market with B buyers 
and S sellers, B/2 of the buyers would use Algorithm A and the 
remaining B/2 buyers would run Algorithm B, with the seller 
population being similarly split, and the A/B comparison then 
showed profitability in the presence of the other trading algorithm. 
A/B tests involving 50:50 splits, as just described, were commonly 
used to establish the dominance relationship between A and B.    
Comparatively recently, Vach (2015) presented results from 
experiments with the OpEx market simulator (De Luca, 2015), in 
which AA, GDX, and ZIP were set to compete against one another, 
and in which the dominance of AA was questioned: Vach’s results 
indicate that whether AA dominates or not can be dependent on 
the ratio of AA:GDX:ZIP in the experiment: for some ratios, Vach 
found AA to dominate; for other ratios, it was GDX. Vach studied 
only a very small sample from the space of possible ratios, but his 
results prompted Cliff (2019) to use the public-domain "BSE" 
financial exchange simulator (BSE, 2012) to exhaustively run 
through a wide range of differing ratios of four trading strategies 
(AA, ZIC, ZIP, and the minimally simple SHVR built into BSE), doing 
a brute-force search for situations in which AA is outperformed by 
the other strategies. Cliff reported on results from over 3.4 million 
individual simulations of market sessions, which indicated that 
Vach’s observation was correct: whether AA dominates does 
indeed depend on how many other AA traders are in the market, 
and what mix of what other strategies are also present. Depending 
on the ratio, AA could be outperformed by ZIP and by SHVR. 
Subsequent research by Snashall (2019) employed the same 
exhaustive testing method, using a supercomputer to run more 
than one million market simulations (all in BSE) to exhaustively test 
AA against IBM's GDX strategy: this again revealed that AA does not 
always dominate GDX: see Snashall & Cliff (2019) for discussion.   
In this paper we will talk about counting the number of "wins" 
when comparing an A algorithm to a B algorithm: in the 
experiments reported in Section 4, we create a specific market set-
up, and then run some number n of independent and identically 
distributed markets sessions with some ratio A:B of the two 
strategies in the buyers, and the same A:B ratio in the sellers. In any 
one of those sessions, if the average profit per trader (APPT) of type 
A traders is higher than the APPT for traders of type B, then we 
count that session as a "win" for A; and vice versa as a win for B. In 
the experiments reported in Section 4, assignments to buy or sell 
are issued to the traders periodically, with all traders being updated 
at the same time, and the limit prices in the assignments came from 
symmetric supply and demand curves where the equilibrium price 
was varied dynamically using the sinusoidal offset function 
illustrated in Fig.4.8 of the BSE user guide (BSE, 2012).    
Our experiments reported here are motivated by this 
progression of past research. In particular, we noted that Vach's 
results which first revealed that the ratio of different trading 
algorithms could affect the dominance hierarchy came from 
experiments he ran using De Luca's (2015) OpEx market simulator, 
which is a true parallel asynchronous distributed system: OpEx 
involves a number of individual trader computers (discrete laptop 
PCs) communicating over a local-area network with a central 
exchange-server (a desktop PC). But many of the other results that 
we have just summarized came from financial-market simulators 
that only very roughly approximated parallel execution: Cliff (1997) 
published C-language source-code for the discrete-event simulator 
he developed to test and compare ZIC with ZIP; and the BSE 
simulator (BSE, 2012) also uses a very simple time-sliced approach 
where, if any one trader is called upon to issue a response to a 
change in the market, it always does so within exactly one 
simulated time-slice within the simulation, regardless of how much 
computation it has to execute to generate that response. Snashall 
& Cliff (2019) noted that the actual reaction-times of the various 
trading algorithms varied quite widely, and in a true parallel 
simulation the slower traders might be expected to do much less 
well than when they are evaluated or compared in a temporally 
simplistic simulation. So, possibly Vach's results were as much to 
do with his use of OpEx as his varying of the ratios of trader-
algorithms. That is what we set out to explore in this paper. In order 
to do that, we developed TBSE, a new threaded (parallel) version 
of the BSE financial-market simulator, discussed in the next section.  
3. TBSE: Threaded BSE 
Much of the functionality of TBSE was directly borrowed from 
the original BSE simulator. The key changes affect the way each 
market session operates. In BSE, each market session is executed 
on a single thread in which a core loop executes repeatedly until 
the session end-time is passed. Within this loop a single trader in 
the market's population of traders is selected at random, and that 
trader is polled to see if it wants to issue an order: this is achieved 
by calling that trader's getorder function. If the trader does issue 
an order, that order is then processed by the exchange and all 
traders in the population are notified of any resultant change in the 
market-data published by the exchange. At that point, all traders in 
the population are given an opportunity to update their internal 
values with the new information, via a function called respond 
that is particular to each specific trading algorithm (that is, 
respond is where much, perhaps all, of the detail of the trading 
algorithm is encoded); and then control loops back to another 
random selection of a single trader to be polled for an order. A 
single pass through this sequence of steps is implied to take a 
notional time of 1/N seconds, where N is the total number of 
traders in the market: in this way, each trader will on average get a 
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chance to issue an order once per simulated second, and will call 
respond N times per simulated second. But if Trader A's respond 
takes 1ms of real-time to execute, and trader B's respond takes 
10s of real-time to compute an answer, BSE's record of simulated 
time is the same in both cases: the simulated clock advances in 
increments of 1/N seconds, regardless of the wall-time consumed 
by the differing respond functions.   
The problem with this style of simulation is that each trader is 
allotted as much time as it needs to execute its getorder and 
respond functions, and it is guaranteed that nothing else in the 
market will change while it executes either of these functions. This 
means that the execution time of each trader has no impact on its 
performance: instead all that counts is its ability to generate an 
order price that will be accepted by another trader, whilst 
attempting to generate the greatest profit. This differs from a real 
financial exchange where all traders operating on the market will 
be operating asynchronously. In an asynchronous market, a trader 
may look at the exchange's market data, i.e. the currently available 
information on that market, and use this to calculate what it 
considers its best order to send to the exchange. However, if this 
trader uses a complex, slow running algorithm to do so, it may find 
that by the time it has completed its calculation, another simpler 
and faster trader has already succeeded in executing a trade, which 
as a result changes the position of the market which may render 
the order than the complex trader has posted less profitable than 
expected. This situation, which happens all the time in real-world 
financial markets, cannot be modelled in BSE.  
To address this, we created an asynchronous threaded 
exchange simulator, TBSE. BSE was written in the Python 
programming language, and so we used that for TBSE too. In TBSE 
each trader executes on its own computational thread, as does the 
exchange. There is also the main thread of the Python code which 
continues to run during the market session and is responsible for 
the distribution of customer orders to each of the traders. Each 
trader thread consists of a loop which executes continuously until 
the end of the trading session. Within this loop the trader first 
receives information of trades which have been successfully 
executed at the exchange, it then updates its own internal record 
keeping if any of these trades involved itself and executes its 
respond function to update its internal variables based on the 
new market data. Once it is updated with the latest market data it 
then executes its getorder function which determines whether it 
should post a new order to the exchange, and if so at what price. 
This order is then put on a queue to be sent to the exchange.  
The exchange operates on this queue, reading orders from the 
queue and then processing them by either adding them to the its 
list of available orders or executing a trade if the new order can be 
matched with any of its current list of available orders. If a trade 
can be executed it then places the details of the resultant 
transaction onto a queue for each trader to read before submitting 
its next order. The system for processing orders and trades is 
almost identical to that of BSE.   
In Python, as with other languages that offer such a feature, multi-
threading is where a processor can operate multiple threads of 
execution concurrently. This differs from multi-processing, which 
Python also supports, where different processes execute 
simultaneously. Both are forms of parallelism, but whereas in 
multi-processor programming multiple processes are executing at 
the same time on different physical processors, in multithreading 
only one thread can execute at any one time. The execution of each 
thread is divided into short segments and the processor regularly 
switches between each thread for a short period of time, giving the 
appearance that all threads are executing at the same time. It is not 
guaranteed that each thread will be given the exact same amount 
of execution time during each cycle, but over the course of 
executing an entire program, which may involve millions of cycles, 
the execution time given to each thread should tend towards the 
same value. In TBSE this means that each trader is given the same 
amount of processing time, so a faster algorithm can complete its 
execution and start processing a second order while a slower 
algorithm is still calculating its first order price. In Python, the 
execution of threads is synchronized by a Global Interpreter Lock 
(GIL) which ensures that only one thread is executing at a time. 
Multi-threading was chosen over multi-processing as most general-
purpose CPUs have no more than 8 processing cores, but for our 
experiments we want to simulate the parallel execution of many 
more than 8 traders operating simultaneously. 
The queues used within TBSE are synchronous first in, first out 
(FIFO) queues, meaning that the trader who places an order on the 
exchange queue first will have their order processed first. This is a 
good simulation of real exchange behavior as it is commonplace for 
exchanges to prioritize orders by their time of arrival. 
4. Results 
Table 1 shows a high-level summary of our results for AAvsZIC, 
AAvsZIP, GDXvsZIC, and GDXvsZIP. Characterizing each of these 
four experiments as Algorithm A vs Algorithm B, the central sub-
table of Table 1 shows the count of "wins" for A and the count of 
wins for B in BSE, with the higher of the two counts highlighted in 
bold font; and then the right-hand sub-table of Table 1 shows the 
corresponding win-counts for A and for B operating instead in TBSE, 
again with the higher value highlighted in bold font.   
As can be seen from Table 1, our results for BSE are consistent 
with those previously published in the literature: there is nothing 
in our BSE results to challenge the status quo: AA>ZIC & ZIP; 
GDX>ZIC&ZIP. However, the TBSE results in Table 1 tell a very 
different story. AA still beats ZIC, which is intuitively what one 
would expect. But the other three dominance relationships have 
been inverted: in TBSE, ZIC beats GDX while ZIP beats both AA and 
GDX – scoring more than twice as many wins as GDX, beating it by 
a larger margin than it beat ZIP in BSE.  
If we chose, we could stop here. We have now established an 
answer to the question that we set out to explore: whether a switch 
to a more realistic (i.e., parallel) market simulation makes a 
difference to the dominance relationships previously reported: it 
clearly does. This is a significant finding and is the primary 
contribution of this paper. However, there is more to say. 
Each number in Table 1 represents the number of "wins" scored 
by a specific algorithm, in a series of 19x500 market sessions, 
ranging over 19 ratios of TraderA:TraderB (denoted by Ra: ranging 
here from 1:19 to 19:1), with n=500 trials at each value of Ra. One 
obvious thing to do is to separate the aggregate results for any one 
pair of trader algorithms into the 19 sets of results, one for each 
value of Ra, and to look for any interesting changes in the patterns 
of wins as Ra is swept from one extreme to another. Table 2 shows 
such a data-set, for AA-vs-ZIC. As you can see, at the bottom of the 
table is the sum of all the wins in each column, and the relevant 
column-sums in Table 2 are the values that populate the first row 
of Table 1. Table 2 adds a third column to the results for BSE and 
TBSE: a variable we call Dwins, which is simply the difference 
between the two algorithm's win-counts. In an A-vs-B comparison 
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of two trading algorithms: if Dwins>0 then A outperforms B; and if 
Dwins<0 then B outperforms A. The two sets of Dwins values shown 
in Table 2 can be plotted graphically in the style shown in Figure 1, 
a paired plot that we refer to as the delta curves for two trading 
strategies tested in BSE and then in TBSE.  
Table 1. Summary of all our experiment results, showing total number of "wins" 
summed over 19 different A-vs-B trials in BSE (central sub-table) and in TBSE (right-
hand sub-table). The 19 different trials vary the ratio Ra of trading algorithm A 
("AlgoA") to trading algorithm B ("AlgoB") from 1:19 through 10:10 to 19:1, and at 
each ratio we conduct n=500 i.i.d market sessions, which are treated as contest 
between AlgoA and AlgoB: if, at the end of a session, the average profit per trader 
for AlgoA is greater than that for AlgoB, then that counts as a "win" for AlgoA. 
Hence, the maximum possible score is 19x500=9,500. In each row, bold-font text is 
used to highlight the larger number of wins in each A-vs-B comparison. As can be 
seen, switching from BSE to TBSE has no effect in the case of AA-vs-ZIC, but for the 
other three cases we see a reversal of the dominance relationship. See text for 
further discussion. 
 
The rest of this results section shows selected highlights from 
digging deeper into the outcomes of our experiments. As it 
happens, a deeper dig unearths some thought-provoking results. 
The delta curves from Table 2, i.e. for AA-vs-ZIC, look roughly 
the same as each other, modulo some noise from the stochastic 
elements in our simulation, and are not shown here, but Figures 1, 
2, and 3 show the delta curves for AA-vs-ZIP, GDX-vs-ZIC, and GDX-
vs-ZIP, respectively. These are the three sets of experiments in 
which the switch from BSE to TBSE inverted the dominance 
relationship between the trading algorithms, and they deserve 
some examination and discussion.  
Table 2. The data that was aggregated into the top row of Table 1, tabulated to 
show the individual results from each of the 19 different ratios of the two 
algorithms used: n=500 at each ratio. The full table is not shown here, because the 
specific details do not matter. Column sums are displayed at the bottom of the 
table, and correspond to the values given in the top row of Table 1.  
 
AA-vs-ZIP (Figure 1). Here there seems to be some coherent 
structure in the BSE delta curve: although AA consistently 
outperforms ZIP, the degree by which it beats ZIP seems to 
attenuate when the Ra is at either extreme of its range, and the 
maximum outperformance of AA over ZIP seems to be when 
Ra<10:10, i.e. when AA is in the minority of the population. The 
relevance of this is seen in the TBSE delta curve in Fig.2: we saw in 
Table 1 that ZIP wins on aggregate in this set of experiments, but 
Fig.2 makes clear that when AA is in a small minority in TBSE it can 
still outperform ZIP, yet as soon as the ratio of AA traders exceeds 
50% its dominance disappears and it is outperformed by ZIP.  
GDX-vs-ZIC (Figure 2). Here, for both BSE and TBSE, the delta 
curves have a clear coherent structure to them, which is something 
that we do not think has been reported before in the literature: we 
know from Vach (2015), Cliff (2019), and Snashall & Cliff (2019) that 
ratio matters, but none of those publications reported or explored 
such strongly coherent relationships between ratio and results, 
between Ra and Dwins. 
 
Figure 1. "Delta Curves" for AA vs ZIP in BSE (left) and TBSE (right). This pair of 
graphs shows the Dwins data, as was tabulated for AA vs ZIC in Table 2: the 
horizontal axis shows Ra and is labelled with the number of AA traders in the ratio; 
the vertical axis is the value of Dwins.  When Dwins>0, AA outperforms ZIP, and 
when Dwins<0, ZIP beats AA. 
Figure 2 shows fairly unambiguously that GDX outperforms ZIC 
when GDX is in the minority, and ZIC outperforms GDX when ZIC is 
in the minority. Figure 3 also reveals that the qualitative nature of 
the swing from GDX dominance in BSE to ZIC dominance in TBSE 
differs from that from AA to ZIP that was illustrated in Figure 1: 
whereas the two delta plots in Figure 1 are markedly different, the 
two curves in Figure 2 are remarkably similar: the TBSE curve could 
plausibly be described as what happens when the BSE curve is 
shifted slightly to the right and slightly down. Also notable is that in 
both BSE and TBSE the maximum outperformance of ZIC by GDX 
happens at roughly a ratio of 1:3, and the maximum 
outperformance of GDX by ZICs seems similarly to happen at 
roughly 3:1. This strikes us as curious in that  experience tells us 
that usually in these kind of experiments maxima would normally 
be expected to occur either at the endpoints of the scale (i.e. at 
ratios of 1:19 or 19:1) or near the midpoint (i.e. at 10:10) why this 
is so is something we aim to investigate in further work.  
 
Figure 2. Delta curves for GDX vs ZIC; format is the same as in Figure 1. 
GDX-vs-ZIP (Figure 3): again, there is a clear coherence to the 
delta curves, although the relationship between the BSE and TBSE 
curves is not as similar as that in Figure 2, and not as different as 
that in Figure 1. In a point of similarity with the GDX-vs-ZIC curves, 
again the peak performance of the two strategies come at ratios of 
roughly 3:1 and 1:3 (and, again, we do not know why this should be 
so) but for GDX-vs-ZIP the relative performance of the two 
algorithms does not level out to zero near ratio values of 10:10 and 
then cross into underperformance for the algorithm that is in the 
majority; instead in BSE GDX pretty consistently outperforms ZIP 
and in TBSE the situation is the inverse: now ZIP is the dominant 
algorithm at almost all ratios, and again the degree of dominance 
falls steadily as the proportion of ZIPs increases beyond 1:3). 
Further work is required to understand why these delta curves 
have this particular qualitative shape.  
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Figure 3. Delta curves for GDX vs ZIP; format is the same as in Figure 1. 
5. Discussion and Further Work 
One thing that is notable from the delta curves in Figures 1, 2, 
and 3 is that, despite the points of similarity highlighted above, the 
effect that shifting from BSE to TBSE has on the delta curves is 
qualitatively different for each pair of trading algorithms: the data 
we have studied thus far reveals no conveniently simple patterns 
that allow us to make a priori predictions or generalizations about 
when Algorithm A will outperform Algorithm B. Figure 2 is the 
starkest illustration of this point: recall that GDX was developed at 
IBM TJ Watson Research Labs, was preceded by two earlier 
versions (GD, then MGD), and when published was described by 
IBM as the best-performing trading algorithm in the then-published 
literature. We do not seek to criticize the IBM team, but our results 
show that, when the conditions are right (i.e., when the ratio of 
GDX:ZIC is in the right range), in fact GDX can be consistently out-
performed by ZIC. Gode & Sunder's ZIC paper had been published 
six years before IBM's GDX paper, and while GDX mixes the 
construction of a probabilistic belief function with techniques from 
dynamic programming, the ZIC algorithm takes up one line of code.  
One avenue of further work comes in attempting to understand 
what features, if any, of the trading algorithms interact in such a 
way that they give rise to the delta curves that we have plotted 
here, and the extent to which those delta curves are affected by 
changes in other significant factors, such as the market's supply and 
demand schedules. Also, here we presented results that focus on 
four trading algorithms that have been used repeatedly in studies 
of artificial trading systems over the past 20 years, but there are 
several other algorithms which could be added into this analysis. 
And, when we're done with analyzing interactions between A/B 
pairs of trading algorithms, we can move on to A/B/C triples (in 
which case the delta curves could be plotted as points on a 
simplex), and then on to various ratios of four or five or six different 
algorithms, etc. But as the number of algorithms involved in any 
one comparison increases, so do the number of trials required (the 
combinatorics are explosive, and the computational cost even of 
the experiments shown here was measured in days of CPU time), 
and so do the difficulties of visualizing and analyzing the results.  
6. Conclusion 
Prior to this paper, anyone reading the trading-agent literature 
would have been likely to form the opinion that there was 
widespread agreement that, in general, AA beats GDX, GDX beats 
ZIP, and ZIP beats ZIC. Only a careful reading of the literature would 
reveal that many of the relevant results came from single-threaded 
simulations. Our results presented here show that while the 
AA>GDX>ZIP>ZIC dominance hierarchy may hold true in simple 
simulations, as soon as real-time factors matter, i.e. as soon as the 
various algorithms are operating in parallel, the computational 
costs of a sophisticated algorithm such as GDX count against it, and 
it can be outrun by simpler but faster algorithms. So, the primary 
contribution of this paper is our demonstration here that the old 
single-threaded dominance hierarchy is not maintained in multi-
threaded TBSE. As Table 1 shows, in A/B comparisons on TBSE we 
have AA beating ZIC, ZIP beating AA, ZIC beating GDX, and ZIP 
beating GDX; results that can be summarized as ZIP>AA>ZIC>GDX.  
Our work calls into question not just the truth of specific claims 
of dominance, but also whether it is ever worth trying to make such 
claims at all, because any trading-algorithm's performance, and 
hence dominance, is clearly so heavily affected by factors 
exogenous to that trading algorithm, chief of which is what other 
algorithms it is competing against, and in what proportion or ratio 
those different algorithms are present in the market: it's a 
manifestly game-theoretic situation, but game theory offers no 
help here. We question whether, in markets that are sufficiently 
realistic to be relevant to the real world, there can ever really be a 
single specific trading algorithm that is "dominant", that actually 
beats all the rest. Hence, we conclude with this: if you think your 
trading algorithm really is the dominant one, you have probably 
tested it in simulations that are too simple.  
References 
BSE, 2012. Bristol Stock Exchange. GitHub repository at 
https://github.com/davecliff/BristolStockExchange 
Cliff, D., 1997. Minimal-Intelligence Agents for Bargaining Behaviours in 
Market-Based Environments. HP Labs Tech. Rep. HPL-97-91.  
Cliff, D., 2019. Exhaustive Testing of Trader-Agents in Realistically Dynamic 
CDA Markets. In Proceedings ICAART-2019. 
Cliff, D., 2019. Simulation-Based Evaluation of Automated Trading 
Strategies: A Manifesto for Modern Methods. Proc. EMSS-2019. 
Das, R., Hanson, J., Kephart, J., Tesauro, G., 2001. Agent-Human Interactions 
in the CDA. Proc. IJCAI-2001, pp.1169-1176. 
De Luca, M., Cliff, D., 2011a. Agent-Human Interactions in the CDA, Redux. 
Proceedings ICAART-2011.  
De Luca, M., Cliff, D., 2011b. Human-Agent Auction Interactions: Adaptive-
Aggressive Agents Dominate. Proceedings IJCAI-2011. 
De Luca, M., 2015. Adaptive Algorithmic Trading Systems. PhD Thesis, 
University of Bristol, UK. 
Gjerstad, S., Dickhaut, J., 1997. Price Formation in Continuous Double 
Auctions. Games & Economic Behavior. 22(1):1-29. 
Gode, D., Sunder, S., 1993. Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-
Intelligence Traders. JPE, 101(1):119-137.  
Rollins, M. 2020. Threaded BSE: Experiments with Parallel Asynchronous 
Algorithmic Trading Systems. Master's Thesis, University of Bristol.  
Rust, J., Miller, J., Palmer, R., 1992. Behavior of Trading Automata in a CDA 
Market. In Friedman, D., Rust, J. (eds) The Double Auction Market: 
Theories and Evidence. Addison-Wesley, pp.155-198.   
Smith, V., 1962. An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior. 
Journal of Political Economy 70(2):111-137.  
Snashall, D., 2019. An Exhaustive Comparison of Algorithmic Trading 
Strategies: AA Does Not Dominate. Master's Thesis, Uni. of Bristol. 
Snashall, D., Cliff, D., 2019. Adaptive-Aggressive Traders Don't Dominate. In 
van den Herik, J., Rocha, A., Steels, L., (eds) Agents & Artificial 
Intelligence: Papers from ICAART 2019. Springer.  
Sommerville, I., Cliff, D., et al. 2012. Large Scale IT Systems. CACM, 55(7). 
Tesauro, G., Das, R., 2001. High-performance Bidding Agents for the CDA. 
Proc.  3rd ACM Conf. on E-Commerce, pp.206-209.  
Tesauro, G., Bredin, J., 2002. Sequential Strategic Bidding in Auctions using 
Dynamic Programming. Proceedings AAMAS2002.  
Vach, D., 2015. Comparison of Double Auction Bidding Strategies for Trading 
Agents. MSc Thesis, Charles University in Prague.  
Vytelingum, P., 2006. The Structure and Behaviour of the Continuous Double 
Auction. PhD Thesis, University of Southampton.  
Vytelingum, P., Cliff, D. Jennings, N., 2008. Strategic Bidding in Continuous 
Double Auctions. Artificial Intelligence, 172(14):1700-1729. 
